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This paper examines how pharmaceutical firms have responded to changes in intellectual property
rights and trade barriers that legalized "parallel imports" within the European Union.  The threat of
arbitrage by parallel traders reduces the ability of firms to price discriminate across countries.  Due
to regulations on price and antitrust law on rationing supply, pharmaceutical firms may rely on non-price
responses.  Such responses include differentiation of products across countries and selective "culling"
of product lines to reduce arbitrage opportunities, as well as raising arbitrageurs' costs through choice
of packaging.  Using a dataset of drug prices and sales from 1993-2004 covering 30 countries, I find
evidence that the behavior of pharmaceutical firms in the EU with respect to their product portfolios
is consistent with attempts to reduce parallel trade.  This may at least partially explain why parallel
trade has not yet resulted in significant price convergence across EU countries.  Accounting for non-price









I.  Introduction 
 
  Firms often rely on trade barriers or intellectual property rights to charge different 
prices in different countries in response to local market conditions.  This paper examines 
how European integration, which involved changes in both trade regulations and 
intellectual property rights, has affected the product market strategies of pharmaceutical 
firms.  In particular, it illustrates the importance of non-price responses, such as 
adjustments in product offerings or characteristics, to maintain price differences across 
borders.   
 
Cross-national differences in pharmaceutical prices are the topic of much 
discussion in the press and in policy circles.  Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA), a 
vocal critic of the pharmaceutical industry, maintains that: “A grandmother on the 
Westside has to pay more than twice as much for her drugs as a grandmother in France, 
in Canada, in Germany, in Italy, and in the United Kingdom. And for some drugs, seniors 
in Los Angeles are paying over three times more than seniors in other countries. This 
unconscionable gouging is unacceptable and has to end."
1   Quite a few studies have 
documented these differences (Stuart et al. (2000), Danzon and Chao (2002), Danzon and 
Furukawa (2005)) and provided some explanations for their underlying causes, such as 
differences in patient demand, national income, and the use of price controls by 
governments.  Historically, these price differences have persisted because of laws 
preventing arbitrage of drugs across borders.  These laws include regulations on the right 
to sell a drug in a country as well as rights granted to patent-holders to prevent the sale of 
a product by other firms without authorization. 
 
  While arbitrage of drugs, or “parallel trade,” remains illegal in most countries, it 
is now permitted within the European Union.  This is part of the move to a single market 
for pharmaceuticals in the EU; other changes include harmonization of regulations for the 
approval of new drugs, the adoption of the Euro, and the application of Articles 28-30 
governing the free movement of goods within the EU.  The EU has established a policy 
                                                 
1 http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/investigations.asp?Issue=Price+Discrimination   3
of “community exhaustion” of most forms of intellectual property
2, which means that 
once a firm has put the drug on the market in any EU country, it may not prevent the sale 
of that drug within the EU by any other firm by claiming a violation of patent rights or 
trademarks, under most circumstances.  The combination of these changes has reduced 
the ability of firms in all industries to price discriminate across EU countries, but has 
been of particular concern to pharmaceutical firms, which face price controls in many EU 
countries. 
 
  The issue of parallel imports is at the intersection of competition law, intellectual 
property (IP) law, and trade law, and therefore is an important policy issue for 
governments and international organizations.  There have been proposals in the United 
States to permit parallel imports from Canada (and other countries) in the last several 
years; re-importation of drugs was an important campaign issue in 2004 for Senator John 
Kerry and the subject of a Congressional Budget Office study.
3   In addition, non-
governmental organizations such as Doctors Without Borders/Medicins Sans Frontieres 
have lobbied extensively for a policy of “international exhaustion” of patent rights, which 
would remove the current barrier of IP rights to parallel trade in most countries.
4  Both 
the law and the strategies firms use in response to parallel imports are relevant not only to 
the pharmaceutical industry, but to all IP-intensive firms that are active in multiple 
countries, some of which contend with illegal pirating that is not well-policed in addition 
to legal parallel trade.
5 
 
This paper examines the extent of parallel imports of pharmaceuticals within the 
EU, and describes the strategic responses by firms to dampen the resulting profit losses.  I 
                                                 
2 In the case of patent rights, community exhaustion is not the result of specific legislation, but rather the 
interpretation of laws on the free movement of goods by the European Court of Justice. 
3 Congress passed a law allowing parallel imports from Canada under President Clinton, but the 
Department of Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug Administration declined to enforce it, 
citing safety concerns. 
4 Under the TRIPS agreement, each country can choose a policy of national (domestic) exhaustion (which 
would allow patentholders to prevent unauthorized imports) or international exhaustion of patent rights.  
Hong Kong and Argentina apply international exhaustion; most (all?) others use national.  In contrast, most 
countries have adopted international exhaustion of trademarks. 
5 These industries include movies, video games, luxury goods, and others.  The sources of the pirated 
copies are countries like China, India, Brazil, and Russia.  See “US Moves to Stop Piracy of Intellectual 
Property,” New York Times, Sept. 22, 2005.   4
find that parallel imports have not yet led to a large reduction in aggregate price 
dispersion across EU countries, consistent with other recent empirical studies of drug 
prices (Kanavos et al. (2004), Danzon and Chao (2002)).  While the number of products 
experiencing parallel imports has been increasing, it is still a small fraction of the total 
number of pharmaceutical products.  I find evidence that efforts by pharmaceutical firms 
to adjust to the threat of parallel imports may have moderated the impact.  The setting 
examined in this paper is useful for understanding how firms adapt to a change in the 
legal environment that affects the ability to price discriminate.  This research highlights 
the importance of considering all strategic options available to firms and the interaction 
of multiple policies when assessing the impact of parallel trade, or a change in trade and 
intellectual property laws more generally. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews the literature on parallel trade 
and describes the pharmaceutical market in the European Union.  Section III presents a 
simple model of entry by parallel traders and describes what strategic options might be 
expected from pharmaceutical firms.  Section IV describes the data, and Section V 
estimates the entry model and presents evidence of strategic responses.  Section VI 
discusses and concludes. 
 
Section II.  Overview of the pharmaceutical industry in the EU and relevant literature 
 
The move to a European Common Market has directly affected the 
pharmaceutical industry in several ways.  One major change is the process of obtaining 
approval to market a drug in the EU.  Historically, a firm wishing to sell a new drug had 
to submit a separate application for marketing approval in each European country, and 
was to different regulatory standards in each.  In an effort to form a single market for 
pharmaceuticals, the EU established two procedures for drug approval in 1995.  The first 
of these, the Mutual Recognition Procedure, allows a firm to apply for marketing 
approval in one “reference member state” (RMS).  Following approval in the RMS, the 
firm may launch the drug in other EU countries without additional applications unless 
another country raises a formal objection over concerns about safety and efficacy.  The   5
other procedure, which is required for biological products but optional for most others, 
involves an application to the newly created European Medicines Evaluation Agency 
(EMEA) for an EU-wide marketing approval.  These processes have reduced the fixed 
cost of obtaining regulatory approval in multiple EU countries. 
 
However, selling a drug in most EU countries involves more than approval 
through either procedure.  In general, prices are not determined by market conditions: all 
but a few countries use explicit price controls on pharmaceuticals, necessitating a 
sometimes lengthy negotiation with health agencies responsible for providing health 
coverage to the local population.  Many countries also specify that the launch price be set 
at the minimum or average of the price in a basket of other countries.  Once a drug is 
marketed in several countries at different prices, therefore, any convergence towards a 
uniform price tends toward the minimum.  For this reason, many firms attempt to launch 
at a uniform price, but this can lead to lengthy launch delays in countries where 
governments prefer to set a lower price (Danzon and Epstein (2005)).  Despite the 
reduction in the fixed cost of additional entry conditional on launch in one EU country, 
there are large differences in the set of drugs available across these countries, which are 
at least partly attributable to price regulation (Danzon et al. (2005), Kyle (2005), Lanjouw 
(2005)). 
 
Besides changes in the approval process, pharmaceutical firms have experienced 
an important change in the protection afforded by patents they hold in the EU.  Court 
decisions by the European Court of Justice during the last 25-30 years have established a 
policy of “community exhaustion” of patent rights and other forms of intellectual 
property, such as trademarks and copyrights.  Once a patent holder has sold a product 
within the EU, subsequent buyers may trade it freely within the EU and without 
interference by the patent holder.
6  Note the patent holder may still prevent the sale of 
products first marketed outside the EU; it remains illegal to import drugs from Africa, for 
                                                 
6 A “derogation” period was imposed for countries with relatively weak patent rights prior to joining the 
EU.  These include Spain and Portugal before 1995, and the eight EU ascension members of 2004 (the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia).  During 
the derogation period, these countries could not serve as sources of parallel imports.   6
example, without the permission of the patent holder.  But the combination of large price 
differences within the EU, some of which exist because of price controls, and the 
inability of pharmaceutical firms to use intellectual property rights to prevent resale of 
their products has given rise to parallel imports. 
 
There are some important restrictions on parallel imports.  A parallel importer 
must obtain a license to import a product of identical chemical composition, dosage form, 
and strength from a country with a lower price.  A single 10 milligram (mg) tablet of a 
chemical is not, by this definition, a perfect substitute for two 5 milligram tablets, nor is a 
10 mg tablet identical to a 10 mg capsule.  If the product has packaging in a different 
language, has a different brand name, or has a different pack size, the parallel trader may 
incur re-packaging costs.  The cost of a license is approximately €1500 in most countries 
or €3480 for products approved through the EMEA.  For additional detail, please see the 
EMEA’s “Post-Authorisation Guidance on Parallel Distribution” and Arfwedson (2004). 
 
In addition to securing a license and finding adequate supply, a parallel importer 
must find pharmacists willing to purchase their imports.  This may seem simple enough; 
the parallel importer can offer the product at a lower price than that of the original 
product in the destination country.  However, there are a host of country-specific 
regulations on pharmacists, in addition to pharmaceuticals.  For example, a number of 
countries, including Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, fix the profit margins of 
pharmacists.  This reduces the incentive of pharmacists to seek out the lowest cost supply, 
and hence their demand for parallel imports.  Germany has imposed a quota on the 
volume of parallel imports a pharmacist must dispense (now 7%), but since his margins 
are fixed, the pharmacist has no strong motivation to find parallel imports that are any 
cheaper than the original product.  The Netherlands and the United Kingdom use 
“clawback” mechanisms: any savings from the use of parallel imports are shared between 
the pharmacist and the government health authority, so pharmacists do have some 
incentive to find a low-cost supply.  Patients in all EU countries have government 
insurance coverage for most prescriptions, and are rather insensitive to price as a result. 
   7
In principle, the legalization of parallel imports, as well as the elimination of 
exchange rate fluctuations resulting from the Euro’s adoption, should reduce price 
dispersion across EU countries.  However, empirical evidence of the effect of EU 
integration on price dispersion is mixed.  Goldberg and Verboven (2005) find that prices 
for automobiles have become more uniform within the EU following the adoption of the 
Euro and other attempts to integrate the European markets, although there remain 
persistent differences.  Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) show that parallel imports have 
resulted in a reduction of the prices of original products for the top 50 drugs in Sweden.  
However, another study (Kanavos et al. (2004)) finds parallel imports have had little 
effect on prices in the EU for the 20 top-selling drugs.  By and large, parallel imports of 
these drugs were not sold at much of a discount to original products.  The authors point 
out that parallel imports do not generate significant savings either to patients or to 
national health systems in most cases.  
 
Most papers on parallel trade assume that the only strategic instruments firms 
have at their disposal are price, rationing of supply, and exit from a market.  The focus of 
these papers is the welfare impact of a move from international price discrimination to a 
uniform world (or regional) price, following Varian (1985).  Malueg and Schwartz (1994) 
show that parallel trade reduces global welfare if there are large differences in demand 
across countries, because firms will choose not to serve low-price countries.  A limitation 
of applying the Malueg and Schwartz model to the pharmaceutical industry is that it does 
not explicitly consider how an inability to price discriminate affects incentives to invest 
in research and development (R&D).  More recent research analyzes the additional 
welfare consequences for R&D, including Danzon (1998), Rey (2003), and Szymanski 
and Valletti (2005, 2006).  These papers point out that parallel trade can reduce 
investment in quality or R&D as a result of reducing profits to patent-holders, so that 
even in cases where parallel trade benefits many consumers in the short run, welfare   8
tends to be lower in the long run.  Most theoretical work does not explore the use of 
second degree price discrimination.
7   
 
Price controls significantly constrain the ability of firms to increase prices, so it is 
not usually possible to set a uniform price at the average between the high and low price 
markets.
8  Another important factor limiting the application of standard economic models 
of price discrimination is EU competition law.  Practices that interfere with parallel trade 
or that can be shown to be an abuse of dominant position, such as rationing supply to a 
low price market in an attempt to restrict exports, are legally problematic.  Several drug 
firms have made attempts to control supply; these were evaluated in Bundesverband der 
Arzneimittel-Importeure and Commission of the European Communities v. Bayer AG 
(C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P).  In October of 2005, the European Association of Euro-
Pharmaceutical Companies asked the European Union antitrust authorities to investigate 




Pharmaceutical firms are therefore limited in their ability to use price and, to 
some extent, rationing as strategic variables in response to parallel trade: in general, they 
cannot raise prices in the lower-price markets (though they should encounter little 
resistance to lowering prices in higher-price markets), and they may not explicitly ration 
supply.
10  Withdrawing all versions of a drug from a low price market may be politically 
costly, and more importantly, could be interpreted by a government as a failure to “work” 
a patent and result in compulsory licensing – which may then also serve as parallel 
imports into other countries.  Due to community exhaustion of intellectual property rights, 
firms may not rely on intellectual property claims to prevent arbitrage across borders.  
                                                 
7 Anderson and Ginsburgh (1999) consider the possibility that firms introduce versions of their products in 
a foreign country in order to price discriminate across consumers with different arbitrage costs, and find 
that under some circumstances, world welfare is increasing in the cost of arbitrage. 
8 These constraints include laws restricting the rate of price increases or requiring government approval to 
increase price.  While pharmaceutical firms could seek a price increase in countries with price controls, 
they find it difficult to persuade governments facing their own EU-imposed limits on budget deficits to 
increase expenditures. 
9 “European Pharma Lobby Group Complains To EU About Pfizer,” Dow Jones Newswire, Oct. 17, 2005. 
10 The inflexibility of prices in Europe is an important difference with the US market.  Scott Morton (1997a, 
1997b) studies how pharmaceutical firms adjusted prices in response to changes in Medicaid laws.   9
Decisions made about the timing of entry and initial price are crucial, given the 
constraints on ex post changes.  A number of papers examine how price controls have 
affected the entry decision (Danzon et al. 2005, Kyle 2005, Lanjouw 2005), and a recent 
paper by Danzon and Epstein (2005) looks at both launch delays and pricing decisions in 
relation to price regulations in the EU.  All these papers use a molecule or new chemical 
entity as the unit of analysis.   
 
This research focuses on the threat of parallel trade in particular (separate from 
price controls), and considers additional strategic choices firms make: that of product 
characteristics.  It follows a number of recent empirical papers exploring non-price 
strategic responses to competition.  Mazzeo (2002) demonstrates that motels choose 
quality to soften competition.  Dafny (2005a, 2005b) shows that hospitals, which also 
face constraints on price responses, find other means to respond to regulatory or 
competitive changes.  This can be in their choice of how to classify a procedure (Dafny 
(2005a)), or in their investment in quality as a product characteristic (Dafny (2005b)).  
Duggan and Scott Morton (2006) find that in addition to raising prices for some buyers, 
pharmaceutical firms in the US introduce more new versions of their products at higher 
prices in response to Medicaid procurement policies.  In industries like consumer 
electronics or DVD distribution, firms exploit differences in product characteristics such 
as standards across countries for geographic market segmentation.  Software firms 
change the characteristics of their products sold in low-price countries to make them less 
attractive to buyers in high-price countries, by removing certain features, for example.  In 
the case of pharmaceuticals, product characteristics such as brand name, dosage form, 
and strength for a particular molecule may serve a similar purpose.  In general, these 
decisions are of second-order concern relative to the decision to launch a drug.  However, 
they can be quite important in the context of parallel trade, and, in particular, for 
understanding why parallel trade has had relatively little impact on price convergence so 
far. 
 
This research uses data on a wider variety of products than the Ganslandt and 
Maskus (2004) and Kanavos (2004) papers, so it is possible to study additional factors   10
that might affect arbitrage.  The detailed information on product characteristics – in 
particular, those characteristics chosen by drug firms after development costs are largely 
sunk – allows me to look for non-price responses to parallel trade.  The data also covers 
15 non-EU countries, enabling me to isolate strategic changes specific to parallel trade in 
the EU separately from general changes in product portfolios.   
 
III. Conditions for parallel trade and strategic responses 
  
  I begin by considering the decision by a potential arbitrageur to begin parallel 
importing a particular product, conditional on having entered the business of parallel 
importing in general.  A first requirement is that a match in chemical composition, dosage 
form, and strength exist between a lower price country and a high price country.
11  The 
owner of the original product, henceforth the originator, has some control over the 
number of matches between high and low price countries.  One strategic response to the 
threat of parallel trade is to market the same chemical with different dosage forms and 
strengths in low price countries than in high price countries.  For example, a drug might 
be sold as 30 mg pills in one country, and 25 mg capsules in another.  The originator does 
face some constraints on its ability to introduce variations: in addition to incurring higher 
production costs, it must receive regulatory approval for each version.  The cost of 
obtaining approval on a new version is significantly less than for obtaining approval for a 
new chemical entity, but additional clinical trials to justify a particular method of 
administration or strength may be necessary.   
 
Assuming a product match exists, the entry condition for a parallel importer is: 
 
() 0 L )q c p (p E E T L H > − − − = Π  
                                                 
11 The stringency of this requirement is unclear.  The European Court of Justice ruled in Kohlpharma 
GmBH vs. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Case C-112/02) that the products must be “substantially 
identical,” and that there be no safety concerns related to the differences.  Future litigation on this point is 
likely.  In addition, the court ruled in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer (Case C-94/98) that when originators replace 
versions that face parallel import competition with new presentations, parallel importers may continue to 
sell the “old” version.  However, differences in appearance might affect the willingness of buyers to 
substitute towards the parallel import.   11
 
where pH is the price of the product in the higher-price country, pL is the price of the 
matching product in the lower-price country, cT is the cost of transporting a product 
between the countries, q is the number of units the parallel importer supplies in the 
higher-price market, and L is the license fee.  That is, a parallel importer will enter a 
product market if it expects to cover its fixed costs (L) with a high enough margin (pH – 
pL – cT) on sufficient quantity (q). 
 
  The originator can influence the entry decision of a parallel importer through 
changes in some of these variables.  As discussed above, originators are generally 
prevented from raising pL due to price controls, but they do have the option of lowering 
pH to narrow the price difference, and therefore the attractiveness of entry to a parallel 
trader.  They can increase the transportation costs for a parallel importer by using 
different brand names in different countries and a variety of different package sizes; this 
requires the parallel trader to repackage the product for import.  Finally, they may reduce 
the per-package volume of sales for a drug by splitting the total volume over many 
different versions.  Since the parallel importer must obtain a license for each of these 
versions in the high price country, this has the effect of increasing its relative fixed costs.  
Rationing – or restricting supply to low price countries – is another strategic response that 
limits q.  It is probably the easiest strategy for originators to implement, at least in the 
short run, but it is also of questionable legality.
12  Due to the limitations of my dataset, it 
is difficult for me to identify when rationing occurs with much certainty.  As an 
alternative, I look for evidence of supply interruptions to certain countries that are likely 
sources of parallel trade. 
 
  Since at least the 1970s, pharmaceutical firms and others have challenged parallel 
imports under trademark law.  While trademarks are usually internationally exhausted, 
trademark owners object to any changes made to packaging that might interfere with the 
                                                 
12 Firms may be sued for violating Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome, which relate to competition 
law.  The courts must determine whether rationing is an abuse of a dominant position and restricts parallel 
trade in practice (intent to restrict is not enough), or there is an agreement between the firm and wholesalers 
to restrict competition.    12
trademark, usually arguing that such changes interfere with a buyer’s ability to identify 
the manufacturer.  The European Court of Justice has established the circumstances under 
which repackaging is permissible in a series of decisions;
13 most of these decisions did 
not result in as many restrictions on parallel trade as trademark owners would have liked.   
While I do not consider non-market strategies such as litigation in response to parallel 
trade, the uncertainty surrounding the legality of parallel imports probably limited their 
prevalence through at least the mid-1990s.   
 
  To illustrate how these various strategies work in practice, Table 1 contains 
package information and prices for Adalat (nifedipine, which is marketed as Procardia in 
the US), a calcium channel blocker that treats high blood pressure, in Finland.  Bayer is 
the originator of Adalat, and has introduced 24 different versions (varying in form and 
strength) in EU countries.  Paranova is the parallel importer of Adalat in Finland.  Several 
points stand out.  First, the price of Paranova’s imports was generally less than US$ .03 
below the Bayer price, or less than a 5% discount.  Second, Bayer only faced parallel 
importing in three versions in Finland.  Third, Bayer slightly reduced the prices of those 
versions that did face parallel import competition.  Finally, Bayer discontinued two 
versions of Adalat that had matching products in Greece, and introduced a new version 
that did not have a match in Greece.  In this particular case, Bayer seems to have 
responded to parallel imports by reducing the number of matches between Finland and 
countries with lower prices and reducing the volume of versions with competing parallel 
imports by introducing another version, in addition to responding with a price change.
14   
  
  In a more complicated model, I would account for other important strategic 
considerations.  For example, cutting price not only reduces the likelihood of entry by a 
                                                 
13 These include Hoffman-La Roche vs. Centrafarm (C-102/77); Bristol-Myers Squibb vs. Paranova (C-
427/93); Boehringer Ingelheim vs. Paranova (C-429/93); Bayer vs. Paranova (C-436/93); Pharmacia & 
Upjohn vs. Paranova (C-379/97); Boehringer Ingelheim vs. Dowelhurst (C-143/00); Merck, Sharp and 
Dohm vs. Paranova (C-443/99); and Aventis Pharma vs. Kohlpharma (C-433/00). 
14 Adalat was the subject of a long-running legal battle in the EU.  In 1996, Bayer was fined for rationing 
supply between 1989 and 1993 to wholesalers in France and Spain, who were re-selling for parallel import 
into the UK.  The claim was that Bayer had formed a cartel with its wholesalers, a violation of EU 
competition law.  In January 2004, the European Court of Justice determined that Bayer had acted 
unilaterally and had not violated any competition law since it did not have a dominant position in the 
market.   13
parallel importer, but also may steal market share from substitute chemicals if physicians 
are sensitive to price differences.  Within a country, originators probably employ some 
second degree price discrimination across packages, and I do not account for this.  An 
interesting extension for future work may be to apply recent innovations in structural 
estimation of firms’ product offerings, such as the model proposed by Draganska, 
Mazzeo and Seim (2005).  I do not focus here on any strategic interaction between 
parallel traders.  I assume that they are essentially undifferentiated and have low sunk 
costs (low exit costs).
15  Pre-launch strategies, such as delaying launch into low price 
markets, are assumed to be independent of the post-launch decisions I consider here.  
Finally, I do not model the choice(s) each firm makes, out of a menu of strategic options, 
although it is quite likely that not all firms respond to parallel trade in the same way and 




  The data used in this research is a subset of the IMS Midas database, which is the 
most comprehensive source of information on drug prices and sales across countries.  My 
dataset covers a total of 30 countries for all drugs assigned to 36 therapeutic classes 
(measured at the 4-digit Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical, or ATC, level) in five 
broader categories for 1993Q1-2004Q3.  These are listed in Table 2.  The dataset 
contains information at the package (i.e. chemical(s), dosage form, strength, and pack 
size) level on the quantity sold within each country, as well as the ex-manufacturer, 
wholesale, and retail price per “standard unit,” typically a pill, capsule, vial, etc. 
measured in US dollars at the current exchange rate in each quarter.  Summary statistics 
are provided in Table 3.  There are 1791 different chemicals (or unique chemical 
combinations) in these classes; 414 of them were introduced after 1990.  This sample 
clearly includes many products that are not “new chemical entities,” but which appear to 
be herbal medicines marketed in only one or two countries, or products which are merely 
new combinations of existing chemicals.  As a robustness check, I have run all the 
                                                 
15 In reality, parallel importers may be a heterogeneous bunch.  The largest of them have sophisticated re-
packaging factories, and certainly some (like Paranova) have been very aggressive in testing EU 
intellectual property and competition law as they related to parallel trade.   14
following analyses on the subset of chemicals that have been marketed in the US, and 
therefore meet FDA standards for safety and efficacy, and obtained similar results. 
 
IMS identifies some products in the Midas data as parallel imports, though the 
source country is unknown.  In the dataset provided to me, the only countries with a 
significant fraction of products flagged by IMS as parallel imports are Germany and the 
UK.  Since other sources have named the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries as 
important destination markets, this suggests that IMS labels only a subset of parallel 
imports.
16    I therefore use additional criteria to identify parallel imports.  If a 
manufacturer or corporation sold any product labeled a parallel import by IMS, I treat all 
its other products as parallel imports too.  To improve on this further, I tried to determine 
whether each corporation in the dataset is a parallel importer by looking at company 
websites, the membership lists of parallel import trade associations in the EU, and lists of 
approved parallel imports available from regulators in the UK and Denmark.  The 
reclassification of products using this information led to a much more reasonable picture 
(consistent with other studies) on the penetration of parallel imports into Germany, the 
UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.
17   
 
Figure 1 shows the share in terms of standard units of parallel imports within the 
set of drugs in my dataset, by country over time.  The country with the highest 
penetration of parallel imports for this subset of drugs is Sweden, although the 
penetration has declined since 2002.  Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, and 
the UK are the other main destination markets for parallel imports.  Figure 2 shows the 
average share gained by parallel imports at the product level, conditional on parallel trade 
taking place, and Figure 3 displays the average relative price of parallel import products 
to originator products.  On average, an originator does not lose more than 10% of its sales 
to parallel imported versions.  This could reflect difficulty in finding supplies of parallel 
                                                 
16 I am forced to assume, for lack of a better data source, that IMS mislabels whether products are parallel 
imports but does include all product sales. 
17 Classification is not straightforward for all firms.  For example, an entity called Delta Pharmaceuticals is 
a parallel importer of some products into the UK.  A firm by the same name markets 2 drugs in Portugal, 
which are flagged as parallel imports using my rule. Delta does not market the same drugs in the UK, so 
these are probably two different firms.  Fortunately, these classification issues affect few observations.   15
imports, consumer tastes, or – based on the relative prices given in Figure 3 – rather small 
(if any) price discounts for parallel imported products.  Note, though, that Figure 3 could 
reflect price matching by originators to (initially) cheaper parallel imports.  I explore this 
point further in Section 5.  
 
Parallel trade takes place only if price differences exist across markets.  In a 
related paper, Kyle et al. (2006) show that price dispersion for pharmaceuticals is both 
large and persistent throughout the time period I examine here.  Roughly half of all price 
differentials at the drug level across the EU exceeded 50% (i.e., a given drug was 1.5 
times as expensive in the priciest market than in the cheapest).  As well, the distribution 
of price differentials did not fall dramatically after parallel trade became possible, and in 
fact fell less than across non-EU countries.  At the aggregate level, therefore, parallel 
imports have had only a small effect, if any, on price dispersion.  In contrast, Goldberg 
and Verboven (2005) find that EU integration has reduced price dispersion in 
automobiles, an industry which, like pharmaceuticals, historically had large price 
differences across countries.   
 
V.  Results 
 
  To begin, I estimate the simple model of parallel trade entry presented in Section 
IV.  The purpose of this analysis is mainly to establish that parallel importers respond to 
factors over which originators have some control, so that the strategic responses I suggest 
can be expected to have some effect on the behavior of parallel importers.  Ideally, I 
would estimate entry into each source-destination product pair, since a parallel importer 
must specify the country from which it will obtain supply.  However, I am unable to 
identify the source country of parallel imports in my data; I observe only the destination 
market.  I therefore estimate entry by parallel importers into product j in country i using a 
logit, and use proxies for the terms in the profit function related to price differences, 
availability of supply for parallel imports, demand for parallel imports, and transportation 
costs.  Table 4 provides these variable definitions and parameter estimates.  I include 
country, time period, and therapeutic class fixed effects to control for differences in the   16
costs or benefits to entry related to regulation of pharmacists, storage requirements, and 
other factors.   
 
Results are consistent with expectations.  The probability of entry by parallel 
importers is increasing in the average price difference between country i and other EU 
member states, the volume of sales in country i, and the availability of lower cost 
supplies elsewhere.  Parallel imports are less likely when the product has many different 
brand names in the EU, since a parallel trader would have to incur additional repackaging 
costs to sell them in country i.  The parameter estimates are largely robust to changes in 
the sample of drugs (results not shown here).  Having demonstrated that parallel 
importers respond to factors over which originators have at least partial control, I now 
turn to evidence of strategic responses by originators to reduce entry by parallel traders.   
 
1.  Have originators reduced price differentials? 
 
Since price controls restrict the ability of pharmaceutical firms to increase price, I 
focus here on whether firms decrease price in order to deter, or in response to, entry by 
parallel traders.  To make entry by parallel traders less attractive, the originator can 
reduce the average price differential between a high price country and those with lower 
prices.  Originators should be more likely to reduce prices of those versions for which 
parallel trade is most likely, i.e., those with matches in several other countries.  They may 
also choose to reduce price on products facing parallel imports, in order to make 
substitution towards parallel imports less attractive to pharmacists or patients.   
 
Products in non-EU countries face no threat of parallel imports, and products in 
the EU face entry by parallel traders only if there are other EU countries with a matching 
version at a lower price.  Similarly, a given product does not experience entry by parallel 
traders in all countries.  To look for strategic price responses, I estimate the regression 
equation: 
 




where i indexes country, j indexes a drug version (chemical/form/strength), t indexes 
quarters, ϕ is a country-drug version fixed effect and κ is a time period fixed effect.
18   
 
I measure potential entry as the number of typical “source” countries for parallel 
trade (in which an identical version is available.  I choose this set based on the following 
evidence.  First, the average price index for pharmaceuticals for each of these countries 
was below the EU average, with France and Portugal having the lowest price indices 
(Urch Publishing, 2001), in 1998.  Second, Ganslandt and Maskus (2004), who have data 
on the source of parallel imports into Sweden, identify Spain, Italy and Greece as 
accounting for 74% of the total there.  I experimented with other measures of potential 
competition.  The obvious candidate is the number of countries with an identical version 
at a lower price, or at a price below some threshold.  I found either a positive coefficient 
or a statistically insignificant one in most specifications.  One explanation for this is that 
parallel traders must invest in some infrastructure in each country from which they export, 
and they have largely sunk this cost for the five countries I treat as “typical sources.”  
While prices for products may vary widely and be significantly lower in other EU 
countries, parallel traders do not incur these fixed costs for only a few products. 
 
Competition takes two forms.  I include the number of competing drugs in the 
same therapeutic class launched in country i. to control for any price changes that are the 
result of entry by competing chemicals, rather than entry by parallel imports.  I also 
include the number of other non-parallel trading firms that sell the same drug in country I 
to control for price changes that result from competition from either generic versions, or 
branded versions marketed by other firms, separate from parallel imports. 
 
                                                 
18 Price is measured in constant US dollars for this analysis.  This introduces some noise through exchange 
rate fluctuations and makes statistical significance less likely.   18
Table 5 contains the results of the price response regressions, which are estimated 
using data from EU countries only (as only these observations would have any variation 
in actual or potential entry by parallel traders).  The results show a statistically significant 
price reduction following entry by parallel imports: for all specifications, prices in the 
periods following entry by parallel traders fall by roughly 3%.  The response to potential 
entry is even smaller.  The coefficient on the number of potential source countries (those 
with an identical version, and which are typically cited as the sources of parallel trade) 
corresponds to about a 1% price reduction, and is not estimated very precisely.  I also 
examine whether prices respond differently to potential parallel trade across countries by 
interacting country dummies and the number of potential source countries (all 
interactions are included, but only a subset are reported in the last column of Table 5).  
While prices in the Netherlands do appear to be constrained by the threat of parallel trade, 
in that prices are about 5% lower than for drug versions in other countries facing a similar 
threat of parallel trade, this is not a widespread pattern.  In fact, prices in the UK appear 
to be higher. 
 
  These parameter estimates imply that firms respond to entry by parallel importers 
by lowering prices about 3%, to potential entry by about 1%, and the response varies 
across countries.  In this setting, the threat of competition from parallel imports does not 
appear to result in large or widespread pre-emptive price cuts.  Parallel trade does have a 
small impact on price once an importer enters the market, but since only 7% of products 
in the EU with at least one matching product actually experience entry by parallel traders, 
this has had a small effect in the aggregate so far.  These results are consistent with 
Ganslandt and Maskus (2004).  Though they find that parallel import competition reduces 
prices by 12-19% for their sample of drugs in Sweden, firms in their study also did not 
react much to potential competition from parallel traders.   
 
2.   Have originators reduced the number of matching products in both high and low 
price countries? 
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To test whether pharmaceutical firms have adjusted their product offerings to 
reduce the potential for parallel trade, I examine the overlap of products between pairs of 
countries over time.  Each country-period is an observation, with a vector of dummy 
variables indicating whether a product is available.  I calculate the Jaccard similarity 
measure of any two country-period pairs, Sijt, as the number of products available in both 
countries i and j in the period t divided by the number of products available in only one of 
the two countries.
19  The higher this number, the more similar the product mix in the two 
countries.  I estimate the following regression equation for both the similarity in drugs 
between markets and also for the similarity in versions of drugs (dosage form and 
strength combinations): 
 
ε ip Relationsh α similarity Market  α Timetrend α α S ijt 3 2 1 0 ijt + + + + =  
 
where market similarity is calculated as the correlation between a set of variables from 
OECD Health Data on demographics and pharmaceutical demand, and the relationship 
between countries i and j is defined as whether both are EU members and whether they 
are likely source or destination markets for parallel imports.  Source countries are defined 
as above (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France), and destination countries are 
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, and the UK.  As illustrated in 
Figure 1, these countries have the highest penetration of parallel imports in my dataset.  
When estimating this equation for version similarity, I include drug similarity as a control 
variable.  Table 6 presents the results of this analysis for drug similarity, and version 
similarity results are in Table 7. 
 
The parameter estimates in Table 6 show that a pair of any two EU countries has 
more similar drugs than a pair of non-EU countries or an EU/non-EU pair, though the 
interaction between the time trend and the dummy for a pair of EU countries indicates the 
similarity of EU markets has increased less than the similarity of other markets over time.  
This may be somewhat surprising, since changes to the approval process in the EU 
                                                 
19 I experimented with other similarity measures, such as the simple matching coefficient and the Bray and 
Curtis coefficient, and found the same results.   20
should have reduced the cost of gaining regulatory approval in multiple EU countries.  
However, it is consistent with Danzon et al. (2005) and Kyle (2005), who show that 
pharmaceutical firms are avoiding or delaying launch in EU countries with price controls, 
which are likely to be source countries for parallel trade. Pairs that include a source 
country and a destination country, like Denmark-Greece, are roughly as close in the 
availability of drugs as a random pair of other countries, despite both being in the 
“common market.”  For the subset of US-launched drugs, pairs of source countries 
appear more similar.  However, this reflects a common lack of US-launched drugs rather 
than common availability, and this result is not robust to the method of calculating 
similarity (results of alternative similarity measures are available on request). 
 
Pairs of EU countries have more overlap of versions as well, and the version 
mixes are becoming more similar over time across EU countries, based on the results in 
Table 7.  However, the similarity in the EU is mostly driven by pairs of “destination” 
countries (such as UK-Germany or UK-Finland).  Pairs that include a source country and 
a destination country, like Denmark-Greece, are less similar than a random pair of other 
countries, despite both being in the “common market.”  Though the coefficients on 
source-destination pairs are not significantly different from zero, note that they are 
significantly different from the coefficients on destination pairs.  This finding holds for a 
variety of similarity measures (not included).  As well, pairs of source markets have less 
similarity of versions available than any other combination.  This is consistent with 
originators taking steps to limit the number of source countries.  Interestingly, the 
interaction of drug similarity and the time trend is negative within the sample of EU 
countries (Models 3 and 4).  This suggests that even as they launch drugs in more 
countries, firms have increased differentiation of versions available across countries.   
 
  Overall, these results are consistent with an adjustment of product offerings to 
reduce the potential for parallel trade.  Similarity of both drugs and versions of drugs is 
lower between pairs of source countries and destination countries than between other 
pairs of EU countries.  In addition, similarity is greatest between pairs of destination 
countries, while pairs of source countries have less overlap of versions than any other EU   21
pairing.  This may indicate a strategy of producing versions for sale in all high price 
(destination) markets, and at the same time producing different versions in each of the 
likely low price (source) markets to limit both the number of arbitrage opportunities and 
the availability of supply sources. 
 
As a second test for how product offerings change in response to parallel imports, 
I look for evidence of product line “culling,” or selective exit of drug versions.  That is, 
are firms more likely to discontinue versions of a drug that are threatened by parallel 
imports or that may serve as a source of parallel imports into a higher price market?  I 
estimate a conditional fixed-effects logit for exit,  
 
ijt t j
ijt 8 ijt i 7 ijt i 6
ijt 5 ijt 4 i 2 i 1 0 ijt
ε κ λ
Controls β ort Threat_Exp n Destinatio β ort Threat_Imp Source β
ort Threat_Imp β ort Threat_Exp β n Destinatio β Source β β Exit
+ +
+ + × + ×
+ + + + + =
 
where i indexes country, j indexes a drug version (chemical/form/strength), t indexes 
quarters, λ is drug version fixed effect and κ is a time period fixed effect.  Exit takes the 
value of 1 if the drug version is available in country i in period t but not sold in any 
period after that.  I measure threat of import as the number of markets with the identical 
product at a lower price that can serve as legal sources of parallel imports.  Threat of 
export is similarly defined as the number of markets with a higher price than the drug 
version.  Control variables include the measures of competition defined earlier (number 
of competing molecules in the same therapeutic class, number of other firms making the 
same drug, and number of other versions of the same drug) as well as the number of 
standard units of version j sold in the previous quarter. 
 
Results from conditional fixed effects logits of exit are contained in Table 8 for 
both the entire sample of countries as well as the subset of EU countries.  Most of the 
control variables have similar coefficients (in sign and order of magnitude) in both 
samples.  I find that overall, if a version is discontinued, the exit is less likely to occur in 
EU countries than in the non-EU subset.  However, products are more likely to be 
withdrawn from destination markets than from mid-priced EU or source countries.  The   22
probability of withdrawal is increasing in the number of source countries with an 
identical match as well as the number of destination countries with an identical match, 
i.e., both the threat of competition from imports (number of source countries) and the 
threat of serving as exports (number of destination countries) increase the likelihood that 
a version is pulled from the market.  The interactions of the source and destination market 
dummies with these threat measures are both positive, though estimated with less 
precision, for the EU subsample, implying that exit is particularly likely to occur from 
source countries when there are many potential destination markets, and from destination 
countries when there are many sources.  
 
These results provide limited evidence of product line “culling” in response to 
parallel trade.  Conditional on withdrawing a version at any time or in any country in my 
sample, firms appear to choose those that are likely to be targets or sources of parallel 
imports.   
 
3.  Have originators reduced supply to low price countries? 
 
An originator may attempt to ration the supply of product to low price countries 
that parallel traders are likely to use as sources.  While rationing is difficult for me to 
identify well, I can look for evidence of selective supply interruptions.  That is, are firms 
more likely to interrupt the supply of versions of a drug that are that may serve as a 
source of parallel imports into a higher price market?  I estimate a conditional fixed-
effects logit for “temporary” exit,  
 
ijt t j
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ε κ λ
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where i indexes country, j indexes a drug version (chemical/form/strength), t indexes 
quarters, λ is drug version fixed effect and κ is a time period fixed effect.  Temporary 
exit takes the value of 1 if the drug version is available (units shipped are greater than   23
zero) in country i in period t-1, not available in period t, but available again in some 
future period.  Explanatory variables are defined as in Section V.2.  Here, however, I 
expect only the coefficients on the source country dummy and threat of export variables 
(and their interactions) to be important, as there is no need to reduce supply to high price 
markets. 
 
Results from regressions of temporary exit are contained in Table 9 and seem 
consistent with expectations.  The coefficient on the dummy for source countries is 
positive and significant, but the coefficient for destination countries is closer to zero in 
magnitude and not estimated precisely.  While the number of destination markets itself is 
not statistically significant, its interaction with the source country dummy is positive and 
significant.  The corresponding interaction between the destination market dummy and 
the number of source countries is close to zero. 
 
Supply interruptions occur more frequently in likely source countries, and are 
more likely to happen when the version in question has a match in many destination 
markets.  Unlike permanent withdrawal, which affected both source and destination 
markets depending on the vulnerability to parallel trade, temporary exit is generally 
confined to source markets.  This is not surprising, given the explicit efforts of 
pharmaceutical firms to ration supply to these countries. 
 
4.  Have originators taken steps to increase transportation costs? 
 
I examine the overlap of brand names between pairs of countries over time to test 
whether firms use different brand names in across countries.  Such differences require 
parallel traders to repackage products for import, and so increase their transportation 
costs.  The approach taken is analogous to that of version overlap.  Each country-period 
is an observation, with a vector of dummy variables indicating whether a given brand 
name is used in the country.  I calculate the Jaccard similarity measure of any two 
country-period pairs, Sijt, as the number of brand names available in both countries i and j   24
in the period t divided by the number of brand names available in only one of the two 
countries.  I estimate the following regression equation: 
 
ε ip Relationsh α similarity Market  α Timetrend α α S ijt 3 2 1 0 ijt + + + + =  
 
Results are presented in Table 10.  Interestingly, pairs of EU countries have lower 
similarity than pairs of other countries.  As expected, source-destination pairs have even 
lower overlap of brand names.  Over time, the overlap between source and destination 
pairs is increasing, but at a slower rate than the similarity between pairs of destination 
countries is increasing.  While version similarity was greatest between destination 
countries and lowest between pairs of source countries, the opposite is true in the case of 
brand name similarity.  This pattern is still consistent with increasing the cost of 
repackaging for parallel importers, however.  The lack of similarity between source and 
destination markets means that parallel importers must relabel many of the products they 
ship to destination markets.  In addition, while there may be substantial overlap in the 
versions of drugs available in destination countries, a parallel importer would be required 
to repackage a product for sale in each of them if they have different brand names.  Thus, 
this use of brand names denies parallel importers significant economies of scale. 
 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
  Policymakers in the EU actively support the development of parallel trade as an 
important step towards a common market in pharmaceuticals.  Some governments also 
hoped and expected that competition from parallel imports would lower drug costs in 
countries with relatively high prices.  The European Court of Justice has, in a series of 
decisions, generally sided against originators in lawsuits related to parallel trade.  Despite 
all this, parallel trade has yet to reduce price dispersion across EU member states very 
significantly.  In short, firms have moved from using third-degree price discrimination to 
a form of second-degree, through increasing product differentiation. 
   25
  In part, parallel trade may be limited as a result of policies set by national 
governments.  Regulations on the profits of pharmacists inhibit incentives for pharmacists 
to seek low-priced drugs, so that many see little financial reason to stock parallel imports 
in lieu of original products.  Patients and doctors in most countries are also rather 
insensitive to price, and probably see no benefit to using parallel imported versions of 
products.  And although much has been done to facilitate parallel trade, parallel importers 
still face many regulations on their activities, including substantial documentation 
requirements due to concerns about drug safety.   
 
However, non-price responses by pharmaceutical firms may also be playing a role.  
Firms do cut prices in response to actual entry, but this affects a small number of 
products, and the price reduction itself is not large.  In addition to rationing supply – a 
strategy that has faced a number of legal challenges – firms appear to adjust their product 
offerings in each country to minimize the potential for parallel trade.  “Versioning” and 
“culling” limit the number of arbitrage opportunities.  Such a strategy is, of course, costly 
to originators: it means additional regulatory fees and higher production costs.  An 
important question is whether these costs add any consumer benefit. 
 
This paper illustrates one way firms adapt to changes in intellectual property and 
trade law.  While the pharmaceutical industry differs from most others in the extent to 
which it is regulated, non-price responses are important for other IP-intensive sectors as 
well, including consumer electronics, college textbooks, and software.  Non-price 
responses such as these have received little attention in the debate over the welfare effects 
of parallel trade.  Firms should have higher profits than under perfect arbitrage, which 
may offset the negative effects of parallel trade on long-run incentives to invest in 
research.  However, these strategies also offset the expected consumer gains from parallel 
trade.  Understanding their impact may be important in evaluating whether to legalize 
parallel trade in other countries, and how to adjust other policies or regulations to a goal 
of price reductions. 
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Table 1: Example of parallel trade in Finland: Adalat 
Year-Quarter  98-1 98-2 98-3 98-4 99-1 99-2 99-3 99-4 00-1 00-2 00-3 00-4 01-1 01-2 01-3 01-4 02-1 02-2 02-3 02-4 
PARANOVA                      
   BBN  RT.MEMB  CT 
TAB 
                    
                      0 0 6 0 M G                   0.54  0.57  0.61  0.62 
           0030MG                    0.43  0.41  0.39  0.42  0.40  0.41  0.41  0.40  0.42  0.45  0.45 
    BBC  FILM-C  TAB 
RET 
                    
           0020MG  0.29  0.29  0.30  0.31  0.30  0.28  0.27  0.27  0.26  0.25  0.24  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.24  0.24  0.23  0.24  0.26  0.26 
BAYER                      
    BBN RT.MEMB CT 
TAB 
                    
                      0060MG  0.67 0.68 0.69 0.73 0.70 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.56  0.59  0.63  0.64 
           0030MG  0.50  0.50  0.51  0.55  0.52  0.49  0.48  0.48  0.47  0.44  0.43  0.41  0.44  0.41  0.42  0.42  0.42  0.44  0.47  0.47 
                      0020MG              0.37 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.35 
    BBC  FILM-C  TAB 
RET 
                    
           0020MG  0.29  0.30  0.30  0.32  0.30  0.29  0.29  0.28  0.27  0.26  0.25  0.24  0.26  0.24  0.25  0.25  0.24  0.26  0.27  0.28 
                      0010MG  0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 
      A C A   C A P S U L E S                       
                      0005MG  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09             
                      0010MG  0.16  0.17  0.17  0.18  0.17  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16             
Numbers in cells are the price per standard unit (pill) in US dollars.  Yellow (italicized) cells are parallel imports of Adalat.  Purple 
(bolded) cells are the original versions of Adalat facing parallel imports.  30
Table 2A: Therapeutic classes 
Broad Classification  ATC-4  Definition 
A4A1  Antiemetics and antinauseants -- serotonin  Alimentary Tract and 
Metabolism  A4A9  Antiemetics and antinauseants -- other 
B1C1  Cyclo-oxygenase inhibitor platelet aggregation inhibitors 
B1C2  ADP (adenosine diphosphate) receptor antagonist platelet 
aggregation inhibitors 
B1C3  GP IIb/IIIa (glycoprotein) antagonist platelet aggregation 
inhibitors 
B1C4  Platelet cAMP enhancing platelet aggregation inhibitors 
B1C5  Platelet aggregation inhibitors, combinations 
B1C9  Other platelet aggregation inhibitors 
Blood and Blood 
Forming Organs 
B1D0 Fibrinolytics 
C3A1 Potassium-sparing  agents  plain 
C3A2 Loop  diuretics  plain 
C3A3 Thiazides  and analogues plain 
C3A4  Potassium-sparing agents with loop diuretic combinations 
C3A5  Potassium-sparing agents with thiazides and/or analogue 
combinations 
C3A6 Other  diuretics 
C7A0  Beta-blocking agents, plain 
C7B1  Combinations with anti-hypertensives and/or diuretics 
C7B2  Combinations with other drugs of group C 
C7B3  Combinations with all other drugs except those of group 
C 
C8A0  Calcium antagonists, plain 
C9A0  Ace inhibitors, plain 
C9B1  ACE inhibitor combinations with antihypertensives (C2) 
and/or diuretics (C3) 
C9B3  ACE inhibitor/beta-blocker combinations 
C9C0  Angiotension-II antagonists, plain 
Cardiovascular system 
C9D0  Angiotension-II antagonists, combinations 
General anti-infectives 
(systemic) 
J1D2 Injectable  cephalosporins 
L1A0 Alkylating  agents 
L1B0 Antimetabolites 
L1C0 Vinca  alkaloids 
L1D0 Antineoplastic  antibiotics 
L1X1  Adjuvant preparations for cancer therapy 
L1X2 Platinum  compounds 
L1X3  Antineoplastic monoclonal antibodies 
L1X9  All other antineoplastics 




L3A9  All other immunostimulating agents excluding 
interferons 
   31
Table 2B: Countries in dataset 
Argentina Finland  Netherlands 
Australia France  Poland 
Austria Germany  Portugal 
Belgium Greece  South  Africa 
Brazil Ireland  Spain 
Canada Italy  Sweden 
China Japan Switzerland 
Colombia Korea  Turkey 
Czech Republic  Luxembourg  United Kingdom 
Denmark Mexico  United  States 
 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics for Midas data 
Number of countries  30 
Number of quarters  47 
Number of unique dosage forms  120 
Number of unique drugs (chemical combinations)  1031 
Number of unique versions (drug-form-strength)  9013 
Number of unique country-versions (drug-form-strength) 21075 
 N Mean SD Min  Max
Standard units shipped in 
quarter (1000s) 
957962 11.24 62.02 0.00001 3223.09
Ex-manufacturer revenues, 
US$ 
957962 559487.28 4622218.48 1.00000 726407713
Ex-manufacturer price 
(wholesale purchase price) 
per standard unit, US$ 
957962 21.94 118.83 0.00001 13700.29
Trade price (pharmacy 
purchase price) per 
standard unit, US$
957962 24.12 129.00 0.00001  14852.14
Public price (price to 
consumer) per standard 
unit, US$ 
957962 32.23 175.72 0.00001  31783.57  32
Table 4: Results from entry regression 
Y = 1 if parallel imports occur for version j in country i 
at time t 
Coef. 
(StdErr) dY/dX
0.028  0.001   Average log price difference between originator price in 
country and other EU countries  (0.019)   
0.291**  0.008   Log of standard units sold by originator in market
(0.006)   
0.043**  0.001   Log of standard units sold in EU at a lower price
(0.007)   
-0.036**  -0.001   Number of EU markets in which product is available
(0.006)   
0.123**  0.003   Number of EU markets with a lower price 
(0.005)   
0.228**  0.006   Number of EU markets with parallel trade in this 
product  (0.009)   
-0.015**  0.000   Number of EU markets with different brand name
(0.002)   
0.073**  0.002   Number of "source" countries with identical version
(0.011)   
-5.565**  0.027   Intercept 
(0.202)   
Number of Observations                        167086 
Log Likelihood                           -34918.318 
Pseudo-Rsq  0.3263 
* = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level.  All specifications include country, 
therapeutic class, and period fixed effects.  Marginal effects are computed at the mean of all variables.   33
Table 5: Results from price response regression 






0.613** 0.618**  Intercept 
(0.029) (0.029) 
-0.031** -0.028**  Post entry by parallel traders 
(0.006) (0.006) 
0.003 0.003 Post entry by parallel traders in other 
versions of the same drug  (0.003) (0.003) 
0.004 0.004 Number of competing drugs in class
(0.002) (0.002) 
-0.019** -0.019**  Number of firms selling the same drug
(0.003) (0.003) 
-0.010** -0.010**  Total number of countries with 
identical version  (0.002) (0.002) 
-0.013 -0.018 Number of source countries with 
identical version  (0.008) (0.012) 
-0.024 Germany * # sources 
(0.013) 
-0.032 Denmark * # sources 
(0.021) 
-0.057*  Netherlands * # sources 
(0.024) 
0.013 Sweden * # sources 
(0.011) 
0.032*  Finland * # sources 
(0.016) 
0.067**  UK * # sources 
(0.016) 
Within Rsq  0.387 0.390 
Number of observations  251216 251216 
Fixed effects included  Period, product*country 
* = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level.  All country*number of source countries 
interactions are included in the regression, but the coefficients are reported only for likely “destination” 
countries (and are generally insignificant for the others).   34
Table 6: Results from drug similarity regression 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4








0.01226** 0.01052** 0.01275** 0.00888** Time trend 
(0.00026) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00031)
0.07590** 0.04124** 0.10117** 0.04121** Pair of EU countries  
(0.00573) (0.00483) (0.00695) (0.00533)
-.00604** -.00353** -.01007** -.00520** Time trend * Pair of EU 
countries  (0.00077) (0.00069) (0.00093) (0.00076)
-.05711** -.05721** -.00261 -.00268 Pair of source-destination 
countries   (0.01517) (0.01240) (0.01838) (0.01371)
-.00707 -.00647 -.00333 -.00332 Pair of destination countries        
(0.01790) (0.01468) (0.02170) (0.01622)
0.00579 0.00583 0.07577** 0.07372** Pair of source countries               
(0.01573) (0.01280) (0.01907) (0.01414)
-.00002 -.00013 -.00276 -.00308 Time trend * Pair of source-
destination countries   (0.00203) (0.00177) (0.00246) (0.00195)
-.00332 -.00347 -.00630* -.00636** Time trend * Pair of 
destination countries   (0.00237) (0.00207) (0.00288) (0.00229)
0.00240 0.00217 0.00295 0.00277 Time trend * Pair of source 
countries   (0.00216) (0.00187) (0.00262) (0.00207)
0.00681**  0.01685** Similarity of OECD variables 
(Correlation)   (0.00128)  (0.00141)
0.34610** 0.37303** 0.49653** 0.54184** Intercept  
(0.00186) (0.00205) (0.00225) (0.00227)
R-square   0.116 0.120 0.092 0.089
Mean of Y   0.429 0.443 0.584 0.607
Sample  All drugs All drugs US drugs  US drugs
Number of Observations   20439 13215 20439  13215
* = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level.  Source countries are Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, and France.  Destination countries are the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Finland.  35
Table 7: Results from drug version similarity regression 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Y = Jaccard similarity in 








-0.00222** -0.00019 0.00585** 0.00630** Time trend  
(0.00025) (0.00041) (0.00087) (0.00095)
0.00273 0.00732** Pair of EU countries  
(0.00155) (0.00179)
0.00226** 0.00176** Time trend * Pair of EU 
countries  (0.00021) (0.00025)
0.36379** 0.39443** 0.38640** 0.39238** Similarity of drugs available 
(Jaccard)  (0.00351) (0.00616) (0.01275) (0.01312)
0.00335** 0.00025 -0.00845** -0.00961** Time trend * Similarity of 
drugs available (Jaccard)    (0.00055) (0.00090) (0.00181) (0.00198)
0.00391** -0.00418** Similarity of OECD 
variables (Correlation)  (0.00047) (0.00093)
-0.00683 -0.00543 -0.00550 -0.00502 Pair of source-destination 
countries                                    (0.00408) (0.00457) (0.00444) (0.00463)
0.03101** 0.03047** 0.03109** 0.03191** Pair of destination countries     
(0.00422) (0.00470) (0.00454) (0.00471)
-0.01584** -0.01812** -0.01482** -0.01584** Pair of source countries  
(0.00480) (0.00540) (0.00517) (0.00541)
-0.00033 -0.00051 -0.00101 -0.00102 Time trend * Pair of source-
destination countries  (0.00055) (0.00065) (0.00060) (0.00066)
0.00041 0.00035 0.00064 0.00064 Time trend * Pair of 
destination countries  (0.00058) (0.00069) (0.00062) (0.00069)
0.00087 0.00137 0.00040 0.00062 Time trend * Pair of source 
countries  (0.00064) (0.00076) (0.00069) (0.00076)
-0.00454** -0.02577** -0.01381* -0.01366* Intercept      
(0.00146) (0.00261) (0.00592) (0.00610)
R-square   0.706 0.560 0.542 0.546
Mean of Y   0.1506 0.1556 0.177 0.175








Number of Observations    20439 13215 3401 3167
* = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level.  Source countries are Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, and France.  Destination countries are the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Finland.   36
 
Table 8: Results from conditional logit regressions of exit 
All countries EU countries




0.396* 0.375  Source country 
  (0.167) (0.236)
1.895** 2.350** Destination country 
  (0.120) (0.171)
0.659** 1.037** Number of source countries with identical 
version  (0.096) (0.144)
0.923** 1.624** Number of destination countries with 
identical version  (0.069) (0.108)
0.095 0.224** Source country*Number of destination 
countries  (0.051) (0.065)
-0.030 0.108  Destination country*Number of source 
countries  (0.048) (0.069)
-0.020* -0.091** Number of competing drugs in class
(0.009) (0.018)
0.022* 0.056** Number of other non-parallel trade firms 
selling the same drug  (0.009) (0.018)
0.624** 0.411** Total number of countries with identical 
version  (0.060) (0.071)
-0.007* -0.018** Total number of unique versions worldwide
(0.003) (0.005)
-0.024* -0.100** Number of unique versions in country
(0.009) (0.024)
-0.511** -0.518** Units shipped in the prior quarter
(0.010) (0.017)
-0.535**   EU country 
(0.084)  
Fixed effects  Version, period Version, period
Number of observations  243716 92061 
Log Likelihood  -9600.1 -4095.9 
* = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level.  Source countries are Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, and France.  Destination countries are the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Finland.   37
Table 9: Results from conditional logit regressions of temporary exit 
All countries EU countries
Y = 1 if temporary exit occurs (units 




0.747** 1.263** Source country 
  (0.083) (0.124)
-0.082 0.172  Destination country 
  (0.078) (0.113)
0.152** 0.252** Number of source countries with identical 
version  (0.045) (0.070)
-0.039 -0.008  Number of destination countries with 
identical version  (0.039) (0.062)
0.071** 0.077* Source country*Number of destination 
countries  (0.023) (0.033)
-0.052 0.001  Destination country*Number of source 
countries  (0.036) (0.048)
-0.009 -0.017 
Number of competing drugs in class (0.006) (0.011)
-0.177** -0.385** Number of other non-parallel trade firms 
selling the same drug  (0.010) (0.024)
-0.033* -0.057* Total number of countries with identical 
version  (0.016) (0.024)
-0.002 -0.002 
Total number of unique versions worldwide (0.001) (0.002)
0.000 0.043**
Number of unique versions in country (0.006) (0.015)
-0.605** -0.670**
Units shipped in the prior quarter (0.006) (0.011)
-0.429**  
EU country  (0.045)  
Fixed effects  Version, period Version, period
Number of observations  261360 94770 
Log Likelihood  -22560 -8929.5 
* = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level.  Source countries are Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, and France.  Destination countries are the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Finland.   38
 Table 10: Results from brand name similarity regression 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Y = Jaccard similarity in 








-0.00027 -0.00220** -0.01160** -0.01238** Time trend 
                                         (0.00027) (0.00035) (0.00102) (0.00108)
0.04195** 0.05597** Pair of EU countries 
                                         (0.00270) (0.00298)
-0.00601** -0.00833** Time trend * Pair of EU 
countries                                    (0.00036) (0.00043)
0.45889** 0.39380** 0.51626** 0.55307** Similarity of drugs available 
(Jaccard)                                    (0.00591) (0.00777) (0.01541) (0.01694)
0.00860** 0.02032** 0.01184** 0.00747** Time trend * Similarity of 
drugs available (Jaccard)           (0.00081) (0.00110) (0.00238) (0.00262)
-0.00290** -0.01586** Similarity of OECD 
variables (Correlation)  (0.00082) (0.00175)
-0.04089** -0.04479** -0.04005** -0.03987** Pair of source-destination 
countries                                    (0.00704) (0.00751) (0.00826) (0.00856)
-0.03893** -0.04382** -0.03670** -0.03489** Pair of destination countries 
                                         (0.00727) (0.00771) (0.00853) (0.00880)
0.01233 0.01437 0.00993 0.01475 Pair of source countries 
                                         (0.00831) (0.00888) (0.00973) (0.01011)
0.00235* 0.00312** 0.00250* 0.00287* Time trend * Pair of source-
destination countries                 (0.00094) (0.00107) (0.00111) (0.00122)
0.00430** 0.00497** 0.00376** 0.00412** Time trend * Pair of 
destination countries                 (0.00100) (0.00113) (0.00117) (0.00129)
-0.00081 -0.00105 -0.00007 -0.00103 Time trend * Pair of source 
countries                                    (0.00110) (0.00125) (0.00129) (0.00143)
-0.00027 0.00438** 0.05174** 0.06365** Intercept                               
                                         (0.00116) (0.00159) (0.00435) (0.00472)
R-square                                 0.816447 0.814760 0.762802 0.768434
Mean of Y                                0.129605 0.123012 0.156134 0.149289








Number of Observations    19082 12153 3402 3168
* = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level.  Source countries are Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, and France.  Destination countries are the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
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